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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to calculate the benefit-cost ratio of Estonian speed camera 
program. The effectiveness of speed camera network is found by using before-and-after 
analysis with the comparison groups. The speed camera effectiveness is measured in the 
numbers of car accidents, fatalities and seriously injured persons. For a more accurate 
measurement, the general traffic safety trend and the regression-to-the-mean (RTM) effect 
are taken into account. The accident data is from the period 2003-2017 and is derived from 
Estonian Road Administration, Police and Border Guard Board, Estonian Traffic Insurance 
Fund, and the Ministry of Finance. The speed camera effects are monetized by using the cost 
of accidents, lives and injuries provided by the Traffic Insurance Fund and Koppel et al. 
(2005). The benefit-cost analysis shows that the speed camera program is beneficial for 
society because the benefit-cost ratio is 4.31. However, the revenue earned by the camera 
network is higher than the total cost of the program, and additional 977 703 euros is added to 
state revenue. The speed camera program could have saved 25 lives since its implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
Every year approximately 1.2 million people die, and 50 million get injured in traffic 
accidents around the world, and this trend is worsening if policymakers do not implement 
new measures for traffic safety (WHO 2015). In Estonia, for example, on average there were 
74 fatalities and 1765 injuries resulting from car accidents in 2013 - 2017 (ERA 2018)
1
. 
The wrong driving speed is one of the leading causes of a car accident and a significant 
reason for death and injuries (WHO 2015). Many developed countries are implementing 
fixed speed camera networks as an extra speed calming measure on high-risk roads. The 
speed camera networks cause high public attention and are somewhat controversial as in 
some public opinion it is more of a state revenue filler than reasonable speed calming 
measure (Tang 2017). There are reports that some speed cameras placements have adverse 
effects on traffic safety and are itself the reason for car crashes (Elvik 1997). Several systems 
have even closed due to the proven adverse effects on traffic safety like Oxfordshire, West 
Midlands, Avon and Somerset, Wiltshire, Swindon and Northamptonshire in Great Britain 
(Tang 2017). There are many systems already in place in many countries. The central 
question for public decision makers is about the real measured effectiveness and the benefit-
cost relationship of current systems and when it is feasible to expand or implement new speed 
cameras on road networks. 
This thesis aims to find out the benefit-cost ratio of the current Estonian Speed Camera 
program on the main national roads. This thesis contributes to the existing literature as it is 
the economic feasibility view to the Estonian traffic safety subprogram. There are two limited 
effectiveness studies about the current Estonian automatic speed camera program (Draba 
2012; Äär 2014), but no economic feasibility analysis has been done. The previous studies 
also analyzed only limited sections of the speed camera program and recommended looking 
at the effectiveness again when more data is available. 
In the international literature, there are many studies about the effectiveness of the speed 
camera networks, but very little has been done about the economic feasibility. The existing 
economic evaluations are sketchy and straightforward. The benefit-cost analysis is more of a 
side product in the existing works and lacking a monetary view of the investment. 
                                               
1
 ERA 2018: Traffic accident statistics: https://www.mnt.ee/et/ametist/statistika/liiklusonnetuste-statistika 
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In the literature review, this thesis first looks into the existing models that make economic 
evaluations for crime prevention in the assumption that this model can also be implemented 
for evaluating the traffic safety initiatives. Then the principles of the speed enforcement 
theory are explored to understand reasons for its implementation. The literature overview 
focuses on effective measurement methods and tactics of automated speed measurement in 
order to identify key indicators and the best way to evaluate available data.  
Methodically this work is using the controlled before-and-after method for evaluating the 
effectiveness of current the Estonian speed camera network. Extra measures are taken to 
overcome the pitfalls of earlier studies like traffic trends and accidents regression to the mean 
(RTM). In the data section, the Estonian traffic safety program and camera network setup are 
introduced with available data of camera locations, accidents statistics, cost of crashes, 
injuries and deaths. The results and discussion chapter identifies the cost-effectiveness and 
benefit-cost analysis of the Estonian speed camera program on observed roads. Finally, thesis 
limitations, implications and future research directions have been provided. 
2. Literature review 
The scientific literature has a wide variety of studies about the effectiveness of different 
speed camera networks, and there are overlapping patterns and common variables on how the 
effectiveness of any speed camera program could be measured after the deployment. The 
current studies are sketchy about the economic view, and thus this thesis literature review 
will map the optimal set of key performance indicators (KPI) from the previous studies and 
finds out how to calculate the benefit-cost ratio for any future speed camera program. This 
thesis will use the identified KPI’s to calculate the cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost ratio of 
current Estonian speed camera program. 
To identify proper studies, following sources were used: internet sources including 
governments, universities, and research agencies homepages (1), electronic traffic safety 
databases (2), the road safety technical library database (3) and science articles databases 
Science Direct, Google Scholar, EBSCO Discoverer (4). All studies had to be in English or 
Estonian language and completed before 2017. Studies were reviewed to determine whether 
they describe an evaluation of the automated speed enforcement program that included 
safety-related outcomes like crashes, injuries, deaths, speed measurements, effective range 
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estimations, detailed economic evaluations and provided detailed descriptions of study 
methods and detailed results. 
2.1 The public safety investments analysis models 
In the literature, there are several types of research and handbooks how to make an economic 
analysis of crime prevention. The two primary complementary ways of estimating the 
feasibility of crime prevention program are cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis as 
shown in Figure 1 (McIntosh, Li 2012). This economic approach can also be adapted for 
analyzing the traffic safety or other accidents prevention programs.  
 
 
Figure 1: The primary steps of cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost analysis of crime 
prevention program (McIntosh, Li 2012). 
The economic analysis has to include at least two variables: measurable crime prevention 
effects and measurable crime prevention costs (McIntosh, Li 2012). According to Levin 
(1995), before the measurements, it is necessary to understand the prevention problem, and 
after the problem has been defined, the scope of analysis is set. Then it will be necessary to 
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analyze how to measure the prevention effectiveness, which alternatives are possible, what 
are the impacts of alternatives, and what inputs are needed for economic analysis (Levin 
1995).  
The inputs data should be quantitative than qualitative when planning measurements, as the 
quantitative data is a more obvious choice and it can directly connect to costs and benefits. 
The qualitative data needs first to interpret, and there is a higher risk of misinterpreting the 
context and thus giving different input to economic models (Welsh, Farrington 2000). When 
the effects are measured then the associated resources and related costs must be identified and 
this way the program inputs get monetized (McIntosh, Li 2012). To obtain the estimates of 
the program effects the before-and-after method (BA), with comparison groups, are widely 
used. When complementing BA analysis data with the related costs, the cost-effectiveness 
analysis is done (McIntosh, Li 2012). 
The purpose of cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis in crime prevention is to give additional 
information to policy and decision makers about how much funds are used or needed to get 
an effect (Chisholm 2000; Welsh, Farrington 2000). CE gives information about the financial 
relationship to non-monetary net effects to audit the project later or to rank it with other 
preventive measures. It does not give any benefit information about the effect on society and 
is somewhat incomplete regarding benefits (McIntosh, Li 2012).  
The cost-effectiveness (CE) is calculated by dividing the total program cost with the net 
effect of the program (Welsh, Farrington 2000), and is expressed in Equation 1. 
𝐶𝐸 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚
=  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
  
Equation 1: The calculation of cost-effectiveness ratio (McIntosh, Li 2012). 
The total program cost is the sum of all costs related to that program; like administrative cost 
(salaries, training), capital costs (office, equipment, transportation) and indirect costs like 
sponsoring and providing for volunteers. The net effect of the program stands for the 
program’s non-monetary effects measured in a determined timeframe against the other 
scenarios like if the program has not implemented (Levin, McEwan 2000; McIntosh, Li 
2012).  
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In the example of McIntosh and Li (2012), if for some reason, the number of car accidents 
exceeds 100, then the causes need to be treated. Then the intervention program of car 
accidents reduction includes increasing the highway patrols in the region. To increase the 
number of patrols a new team of Traffic Police Officers must be hired. The extra cost is      
100 000 euros per year (office, salaries, and equipment). If after intervention the car accidents 
with injuries have fallen to 50 per year, then the CE is found by dividing the total program 
cost of € 100 000 to 50 car accidents with injuries prevented. That is 2000 euros per car 
accident with injuries prevented.  
The cost-effectiveness ratio is the monetary relationship per number of achieved net effects 
and is useful for auditing or ranking different initiatives with the same dimension (Welsh, 
Farrington 2000). CE does not give beneficiary information to society. To overcome this 
limitation, it can be developed further to give the monetary benefits for the society, and this is 
the benefit-cost analysis (Welsh, Farrington 2000; McIntosh, Li 2012). For estimating the 
benefits for the society, the effects of the program must be measured and monetized. In the 
benefit-cost analysis, the benefits are the savings for the society (Welsh, Farrington 2000).  
The benefits and costs can be tangible and intangible. The tangible costs are, for example, 
insurance related costs and costs to replace damaged property or running prevention program. 
The intangible costs are calculated hypothetical lost income or future profits. In public sector 
view, the “profit” is instead of avoiding potential losses (Chisholm 2000; Levin, McEwan 
2000; Welsh, Farrington 2000; McIntosh, Li 2012).  
The purpose of benefit-cost analysis in crime prevention is to give additional information to 
policy and decision makers about the benefits of society per euro invested (Welsh, Farrington 
2000).  
To make an economic evaluation we have to introduce new variables like the Potential 
Societal Savings (PSS) per undesired key performance indicators (KPI) like the number of 
crimes, accidents or fatalities. The PSS includes all tangible and intangible costs to victims, 
insurances, the criminal justice system and other stakeholders that will be avoided per 
number of KPI. The KPI’s are the net effects in numbers that the prevention program helps to 
achieve (McIntosh, Li 2012). The calculation is expressed in Equation 2. 
𝐵𝐶𝑅 =
𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐾𝑃𝐼) × 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 (𝐾𝑃𝐼 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
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Equation 2: The calculation of the benefit-cost ratio (McIntosh, Li 2012), adopted by the 
author. 
Let’s assume that PSS is 5000 euros per car accident with injured person (cost of KPI in 
euros), and the accident reduction (KPI averted) is 50. Then the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is 
found by multiplying the PSS per accident to the net effects of the program (the KPI averted) 
and then dividing it with the total costs of the program (McIntosh, Li 2012). BCR is found by 
multiplying 5000 euros per car accident to 50 car accidents averted and then dividing it with 
the program cost of 100 000 euros, which is 2.5. When we subtract the investment, then the 
society would save extra 1.5 euros per every invested euro. BCR is useful for ranking 
different prevention initiatives by monetary value (Welsh, Farrington 2000). 
2.2 Speed enforcement theory 
The most common argued reason for speed enforcement has been the traffic safety and most 
empirical studies in traffic safety will support the postulated theories about the relationship 
between the car speed, accident risk, and collision severity (Chen et al. 2002). It has been 
widely theorized that the higher the speed of a car the higher the risk of accident and thus the 
more severe are the collision consequences (Fildes et al. 1991). Some researchers have 
generalized that for every 1-km/h increase in mean traffic speed above the speed limit will 
increase the accident risk around 3% (Finch et al. 1994). The simplified explanations based 
on raw physics as the stopping distance of speeding car will increase exponentially, and the 
accumulated energy will dissipate in the accident to the power of two of the impact speed 
(Fildes et al. 1991). On the other hand, more elaborate studies argue that the higher speeds do 
not always mean higher accident risk and are rather dependent on the design and condition of 
the road and collision risk will be increased by the speed variance between individual 
vehicles on the same road (Chen et al. 2002). 
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2.3 The speed camera system effectiveness for reducing accidents 
There are two major ways to enforce speed limits - the manned and automatic speed control. 
The classic way relies heavily on the manned police patrols on the street. It has been argued 
that speed enforcement deterrence effect achieved through uncertainty as the speed checks 
will take place in random locations and times on the road corridor (Chen et al. 2002).  
Sometimes prevention of further violations will be achieved by personal contact while the 
officer is issuing a ticket on the spot. It is quick and clear punishment for the errant drivers as 
officers usually reinforce the infringement with warnings and educational messages (Tay 
2007).  
Some researchers argue that manned enforcement cannot permanently reduce speeding 
behavior and accidents as the lack of resources and driver’s motivation are not enough to 
cause permanent deterrence effect everywhere. Therefore, the automated speed enforcement 
should be a reasonable complement to manned patrols (Elvik 1997; Newstead et al. 2001). 
Automatic speed enforcement based on general deterrence theory where potential violators 
will refrain from speeding as they desire to avoid punishment or other legal consequences 
(Ross, 1982). As the speed camera system works 24/7, the likelihood of being detected and 
punished is almost inevitable. It has been hypothesized that automatic speed enforcement 
programs would regress the traffic speeds towards the mean speed and will also reduce the 
variance of traffic speeds at the speed camera deployment sites (Chen et al. 2002). 
The automatic speed limit enforcement solutions have been deployed for 30 years. There are 
many different speed camera systems in place in many countries, and several research groups 
have studied the effectiveness of single systems. Thus, there are a variety of studies about the 
effectiveness of the local system and also several literature reviews about the previous 
studies. For the literature review of this thesis, the primary interests are the effectiveness and 
economic feasibility analyses of the speed camera networks. 
In total, 16 studies met the inclusion criteria and were analyzed for the literature review. The 
literature overview in Table 1, the first column is authors and year to give an overview of the 
variety of studies done in the automated speed enforcement area. The description of camera 
network is added to give an overview of the camera types the observed studies used. The 
static speed cameras are stationary systems, the mobile speed cameras are movable and 
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change the measuring sites. In the observation method section, there are overviews of 
methods used for analyzing the results, and in the key performance indicator section, you can 
find an overview of the main findings of the selected studies in a comparable way.  
Table 1: The literature review with main findings 
Study, 
authors, 
year 
Description of the static 
speed camera network 
Used observation 
methods 
Key performance 
indicators (KPI), 
reductions or other effects 
Elvik (1997) Cameras: 64 (static); Site: 
Norway: Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
Before and after study; Crashes: -12% 
Injuries: -20% 
Mountain, 
Hirst, 
Maher 
(2004) 
Cameras: 62 (static) 
Site: Across UK 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
Empirical Bayes; Speed: -6%;  
Speeding: -35%;  
Crashes: -25%;  
Injuries: -11%;  
Deaths: -11%;  
Crash migration: +5%;  
Effect range: 500m;  
Safety spillover: 1km effect 
Mountain, 
Hirst, 
Maher 
(2005) 
Cameras: 79 (static) 
Site: 79 sites, UK 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
Empirical Bayes; Speed: -4% 
Speeding: -33% 
Crashes: -6% 
Injuries: -20% 
Deaths: -24% 
Pérez, Marí-
Dell’Olmo, 
Tobias, 
Borrell 
(2007) 
Cameras: 8 (static) 
Site: Barcelona, Spain 
Evaluation period: 
Two years before and after 
Time-series study with 
a comparison group; 
Crashes: -27% 
Injuries: -26% 
 
Hess, Polak 
(2007) 
Cameras: 43 (static); Site: 
Cambridgeshire, UK; 
Evaluation period: 11 years 
of time series data collection 
ARIMA/SARIMA 
(remove trend and 
seasonal effects) 
time series analysis; 
Before and after 
comparison; 
Crashes: -32% 
Injuries: -31% 
Deaths: -28% 
BCA: 1:5 
Shin, 
Washington, 
Schalkwyk  
(2009) 
Cameras: 6 (static) 
Site: Scottsdale, Arizona, US 
Evaluation period: 
Two years 
Before and after 
analysis using a 
comparison group and 
traffic flow correction; 
Empirical Bayes 
analysis with time-
variant safety; 
Speed (average): - 14km/h 
Crashes: - 44% to -54% 
Injuries: -28% to -48% 
Deaths: - 46% to -56% 
BCA: $17 million per year 
Safety spillover: None 
Li, Graham. 
(2013) 
Cameras: 771 (static) 
Site: Across UK 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
Propensity score 
matching; 
Empirical Bayes;  
Control sections for 
matching observations; 
Crashes: -23% to -31% 
Deaths: -3% to -11% 
Crash migration: None 
Effect range: 200 - 500m 
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Table 1: continued. 
Carnis, 
Blais  
(2013) 
Cameras: 2756 (static); Site: 
France 
Evaluation period: 2 years 
before and seven years after 
Interrupted time-series 
analyses; 
Injuries: -26% 
Deaths: -21% 
Äär (2014) Cameras: 56 (static) 
Site: Main roads, Estonia 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
The before and after 
study with comparison 
group; 
Empirical Bayes; 
Crashes: reduction in 
Tallinn – Narva road; 
Injuries: inconclusive, the 
national trend is higher; 
Deaths: inconclusive, the 
national trend is higher; 
Effect range: 200m 
Keall, 
Povey,  
Frith  
(2001) 
Cameras: n/a (mobile) 
Site: 4 sites in New Zeland 
Evaluation period: 
One year before and after 
Interrupted time-series 
design with 
comparison group; 
Speed (mean): - 0,7 km/h 
Crashes: -11% 
Injuries: -19% 
Deaths: -8% 
Safety spillover: Yes 
Chen, 
Meckle, 
Wilson 
(2002)  
Cameras: 12 (mobile) 
Site: 22km highway in 
British Columbia, Canada; 
Evaluation period:  
Two years before and after 
Simple before and 
after;  
Empirical Bayes; 
Speed: -3% 
Crashes: -16% 
Crash migration: None 
Safety spillover: Yes 
Christie, 
Lyons, 
Dunstan, 
Jones 
(2003) 
Cameras: 101 (mobile) 
Site: South Wales, UK 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and one 
year after 
Controlled before and 
after study with a 
circular zone around 
the camera and a route 
based method; 
Injuries: -50% 
Effect range: 300 - 500m 
 
Newstead, 
Cameron 
(2003) 
Cameras: mobile, 2500 
random measuring sites 
Site: Queensland, Australia 
Evaluation period: 
Five years before and after 
Quasi-experimental 
A study design with 
Poisson log-linear 
statistical model; 
Injuries: -21% 
Deaths: -32% 
BCA: 1:47 
Crash migration: n/a 
Effect range: 500 – 1500m 
Safety spillover: Yes 
Gains, 
Heydecker, 
Shrewsbury, 
Robertson 
(2004) 
Cameras: 2300 (mixed) 
Site: 23 sites UK 
Evaluation period: 
Three years before and after 
Simple before and 
after;  
Empirical Bayes; 
Speed: -7% 
Speeding: -91% 
Crashes: -22% 
Injuries: -42% 
BCA: 4:1 
Goldenbeld, 
van Schagen 
(2005) 
Cameras: 28 (mixed) 
Site: Rural roads Friesland, 
Netherlands 
Evaluation period: 5 years 
before and eight years after 
Before and after study 
with an experimental 
(targeted speed 
enforcement) and a 
comparison (no 
targeted speed 
enforcement) 
condition; 
Speed (mean): -4 km/h 
Speeding: -12% 
Crashes: -21% 
Injuries: -22% 
Jones 
Sauerzapf, 
Haynes 
(2008) 
Cameras: 29 (mobile) 
Site: Norfolk, England 
Evaluation period: 
Two years before and after 
Before and after 
analysis; 
Crashes: -19% 
Deaths: -44% 
Crash migration: No 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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For easier comparison, the following indicators were defined: (1) The speed to indicate the 
effects to mean speeds. (2) The speeding to indicate the effect of reducing speeding. (3) The 
crashes are for indicating the effects of accidents without injured people. (4) The injuries are 
for indicating crashes that involved at least one person injured. (5) The deaths for indicating 
crashes that involved at least one death. (6) The BCA is to indicate if the benefit-cost analysis 
has done and what was the result. (7) The crash migration is for indicating if the study 
observed accident migration to other roads or no camera sections in the road corridor. (8) The 
effects range is for indicating the speed camera systems effective range, (9) The safety 
spillover is to indicate if the study observed overall safety increase outside of the speed 
cameras effective range due to the speed cameras. 
To summarize the main findings of the literature review in Table 1: the relative reduction in 
average speed ranged from 3% to 7% and the reduction in the proportion of vehicles speeding 
ranged from 35% to 91%. Collision reductions varied 10% to 50%, injuries reduced 20% to 
50% and deaths reduced 21% to 35% in the vicinity of camera sites. There is minor evidence 
of accident migration (Mountain et al. 2004) on the highway corridor or parallel roads. 
Several studies observed the speed reduction over broader geographical areas and thus found 
the negative impact to traffic flows (Goldenbeld, van Schagen 2005; Mountain et al. 2004).  
The safety spillover effect along the road was observed with only mobile speed cameras; 
static cameras had an effective safety range of 200 – 1000 m. After 1500 m, the effects were 
similar to no treatment zones (Shin et al. 2009; Mountain et al. 2004; Li et al. 2009; Christie 
et al. 2002). The difference between the safety spillover of static and mobile speed cameras 
effect comes from the unpredictable deployment time and location of the mobile cameras 
thus it has increased deterrence effects to keep posted speed limits along the road corridors 
(Chen et. all 2002; Newstead and Cameron 2003). 
Methodically the most common way of traffic safety studies is before-and-after observations 
with and without controlled comparison roads. The main pitfall of using naive before-and-
after studies is to ignore the national traffic safety trend and the accidents regression-to-mean 
(RTM) on sites where there have been historically high accident rates (Elvik 1997; Hauer et 
al. 2002; Mountain et al. 2004).  
The trend means that the traffic safety also increases by other means like safer cars, better 
roads, public campaigns, police interventions and changes in traffic flows. To correctly 
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evaluate the effects of speed camera networks the other safety effects should be measured and 
excluded. Otherwise, the camera networks effects are most likely incorrectly estimated 
(Elvik, 1997; Mountain et al. 2004; Hirst et al. 2004).  
The RTM effect is a random fluctuation of accidents, and it should be calculated when there 
is high probability it distorts the safety-related estimations considerably (Elvik, 1997). To 
disaggregate the RTM effect, the Empirical Bayes method (EB) used in many studies. It has 
argued, that EB increases the precision of estimates when there is limited safety-related data 
available like a low number of accidents or a short observation period (2-3 years), and it 
corrects the RTM bias more accurately (Elvik, 1997; Mountain et al. 2004; Hirst et al. 2004). 
However, in the five year evaluation period, the RTM effect is around 5-10% of accidents 
(Goldenbeld, van Schagen 2005). The EB is the standard method for estimating the RTM 
effect in traffic accidents research (Hauer et al. 2002; Mountain et al. 2004; Lord et al. 2010). 
2.4 The primary key performance indicators of automatic speed enforcement. 
From the literature review in Table 1, all the studies contain one or all of the following key 
performance indicators (KPI): (a) Minor crash reduction which represents the car accidents 
where there are no human casualties. In Estonia, these are primarily traffic insurance cases, 
and the police will be involved only if the parties to the traffic accident do not reach an 
agreement on the perpetrator; (b) Injuries reduction, which represents all cases where at least 
one person needs medical attention after the car accident; (c) Fatalities reduction, which 
represents all the cases where an injured person dies within 30 days after the accident. The 
police must be involved in cases b and c (Liiklusseadus, 2018). 
These key indicators are affected by several other variables. From the literature review, the 
following variables were identified: vehicle speeds and speeding. The higher the speeds, the 
more severe are the consequences of the accident and the more likely the accident is to occur 
(Finch et al. 1994). Speeding means that the variance between vehicle speeds increased and 
thus more overtaking maneuvers also increase the risk of accidents (Chen et al. 2002). 
Speeding also increases the traffic fluctuations (kangaroo jumps) that in turn reduce the 
traffic flow and affects the mean speed, traffic density and crash migration in the highway 
corridor (Chen et al. 2002; Mountain and Hirst 2004). 
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3. Methods 
In order to calculate the benefit-cost ratio for speed camera network, the following steps will 
be made: 
1. Define the scope of economic analysis through literature review (chapters 2.1 to 2.3) 
2. Define the key performance indicators (chapter 2.4) 
3. Acquire and analyze the available data (chapters 4.1 to 4.6). 
4. Identify the effectiveness of the speed camera program (chapters 3.2, 5.1 and 5.2). 
5. Identify the cost of the speed camera program (chapters 3.3 to 3.4 and 5.3). 
6. Identify the tangible and intangible savings for the society (chapters 3.4 and 5.4). 
7. Calculate the effectiveness of speed camera groups (chapters 3.3 and 5.5). 
8. Calculate the benefit-cost ratio of the speed camera program (chapters 3.4 and 5.6).  
3.1 The effectiveness of speed camera program 
For determining the effects of the speed camera program, the before-and-after method with 
comparison groups is used. By looking nationally, we observed road based accident data and 
comparing it with the speed camera effect zones of one-kilometer range from speed camera 
measuring cabin installment. The one kilometer range for up and down the road has shown 
proven effectiveness, regarding the boundaries of static speed cameras from the literature 
review (Chen et al. 2002; Newstead and Cameron 2003; Li et al. 2013). For eliminating the 
inaccuracy risk of RTM effect, the extended dataset from 2003 to 2017 is used and 
recommended by Goldenbeld and van Schagen (2005).  
An extra two km buffer zone is added between the camera enforcement zone and comparison 
group by the author to remove any spillover effects to the comparison group, as some 
researchers have measured the camera effects up to 1.5 km from speed cameras (Newstead 
and Cameron 2003). The before-and-after method is used to compare the number of 
accidents, fatalities, and injuries on the observed periods and in combined form is referred as 
KPI. 
3.2 The before-and-after method with comparison groups 
The observed speed camera zones effectiveness is measured by using the before-and-after 
method with comparison group method described first by Hauer (1997). This method 
removes the traffic safety trend effect that usually causes the overestimation of the speed 
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camera intervention (Hisrt et al. 2004). The control groups are sections of the observed road 
without speed cameras and are similar in physical characteristics, accident rates. For 
example, the four-lane highway sections are excluded as these are not comparable with the 
ordinary road with two lanes. The trend is found by taking the average of control groups and 
comparing it with the accident data of the before and after the speed camera deployment. For 
a more accurate estimation, the control group is compared with the speed camera zones to 
calculate the comparability odds ratio. If the odd is near one, then the groups are comparable 
(AASHTO 2010). For calculating the effectiveness of speed camera networks the variables 
and equations are described by Hauer (1997) and Hisrt et al. (2004). The KPI is representing 
minor crashes, accidents, fatalities or injured persons in traffic accidents. The variables of the 
before-and-after method used are: 
 tB = time in years before speed camera program intervention; 
 tA = time in years after speed camera program intervention; 
 KPIBfNoCam = KPI in numbers before tB on the control group road with no cameras; 
 KPIAfNoCam = KPI in numbers after tA on the control group with no cameras; 
 KPIBfCam = KPI in numbers before tB on the 1000m range of observed the road with 
cameras; 
 KPIAfCam = KPI in numbers after tA on the 1000m range of observed the road with 
cameras. 
To find the comparability of the control group and enforcement zone the odds ratio (OR) of 
accidents (Acc) is found by using Equation 3. If the OR is between 0.9 and 1.1, both groups 
are similar with the confidence of 95%. If OR >0.9 then the control group performs under the 
treatment group and if OR < 1.1 the treatment group performs over the comparison group 
(AASHTO 2010). The OR is found by dividing the relationship between the multiplication of 
the camera site accidents before the camera intervention (KPIBfCam) with the accidents of the 
control group of after the camera intevention (KPIBfCam) with the multiplication of the camera 
site accidents after the camera intervention (KPIAfCam) with the accidents of the control group 
of before the camera intevention (KPIBfNoCam) with the sum of one, inverse relationship of 
accidents of camera site after camera intervention(1/KPIAfCam) and inverse relationship of 
accidents of control group (1/KPIBfNoCam) before the camera intervention (Hisrt et al. 2004). 
The equation is presented by Equation 3, and the results are in Table 7. 
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𝑂𝑅 =
(𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚 × 𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑚)/(𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚 × 𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑚)
1 + (
1
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚  
) + (
1
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑚
)
 
Equation 3: The comparability odds ratio (Hisrt et al. 2004), adopted by the author 
In order to calculate the reduction of accidents in percentage, the average number of accidents 
of after period is subtracted from the average number of accidents of the before period, and 
the difference is divided by the average of accidents of the before period (Hisrt et al. 2004). 
This relationship is expressed by the Equation 4. The results are presented in Table 7. 
𝐴𝑅 (%) =
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚
𝑡𝐴 −
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚
𝑡𝐵
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚
𝑡𝐵
× 100% 
Equation 4: The KPI reduction (AR) % (Hisrt et al. 2004), adopted by the author 
The number of the expected KPI (KPIE) after the observed period, if cameras have not 
deployed, is found by multiplying the KPI before (KPIBfCam) the intervention of the camera 
system with the relationship between the KPI of after period (KPIBfNoCam) and KPI of the 
before period (KPIBfNoCam) of the control group (Hisrt et al. 2004). The results are presented 
in Table 7. 
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐸 = 𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚 ×
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑚
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐵𝑓𝑁𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑚
 
Equation 5: The expected KPI in numbers (Hisrt et al. 2004), adopted by the author 
The effect of speed cameras (ESC) in KPI is found by the subtracting the average KPI of 
after the camera intervention from the average of expected KPIE over the same period (Hisrt 
et al. 2004). The results are presented in Table 7. 
𝐸𝑆𝐶 =
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐴𝑓𝐶𝑎𝑚
𝑡𝐴
−
𝐾𝑃𝐼𝐸
𝑡𝐴
 
Equation 6: The effectiveness of speed cameras by KPI (Hisrt et al. 2004), adopted by the 
author. 
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3.3 The cost-effectiveness analysis of speed camera program 
The goal of cost-effectiveness in this thesis is to show how much impacts are costing in the 
context of preventing traffic accidents. The calculation equation of the cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CE) of traffic safety program is found by dividing the speed camera program cost 
with the total prevented KPI (McIntosh, Li 2012) as shown in Equation 6. The results are 
presented in chapter 5.5. 
𝐶𝐸 =  
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 
𝐾𝑃𝐼 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚
 
Equation 7: Calculating the cost-effectiveness (McIntosh, Li 2012), adopted by the author. 
The program cost includes personnel, processing, and capital costs (McIntosh, Li 2012), and 
can be described as the sum of disaggregated costs and is illustrated by Equation 8. The 
results are presented in chapters 4.3 and 4.4. 
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑎 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 = 𝐼 + 𝑆 + 𝑃  
Equation 8: Calculating the cost of speed camera program (McIntosh, Li 2012), adopted by 
the author. 
Where the speed cameras program cost can be found by adding the cost of infrastructure (I), 
the cost of written warning software (S) and the cost of Police processors work (P).  
The KPI prevention will involve all savings the intervention causes. The speed camera 
program's effect is found when the trend, RTM, and KPI values are subtracted from the 
period prior to the intervention. That will involve all losses and cost caused by traffic 
accidents (McIntosh, Li 2012; Hirst et al. 2004). KPI’s prevented by the program is 
illustrated by Equation 8. The results are presented in chapter 5.6. 
𝐾𝑃𝐼 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 =  𝐾𝑃𝐼(𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒) − 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑅𝑇𝑀 −  𝐾𝑃𝐼(𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟) 
Equation 9: The calculation of the KPI (McIntosh, Li 2012; Hirst et al. 2004), adopted by the 
author. 
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3.4 The benefit-cost analysis of the speed camera program 
When analyzing the benefit-cost model of crime prevention, reconciling community spending 
on money is the direct benefit of preventing crime or accidents from extracting economic 
benefits from an investment. Ordinary profits are replaced by societal savings that could be 
lost in the absence of a program (Levin, McEwan 2000; Cohen, Piquero 2009; McIntosh, Li 
2012). However, speed camera programs usually earn some revenue by sending fines for 
speeders, and this should be included as a benefit as this puts the burden on the speeders and 
thus reduces the program cost to the whole society. 
Benefit-cost analysis (BCA) shows, in the view of prevention programs, how many euros a 
society saves in every euro invested (Levin, McEwan 2000). This result can be used to 
evaluate the impact of alternative programs (Welsh, Farrington 2000). The equation for 
calculating the benefit-cost ratio for speed camera program is in Equation 9. The results are 
presented in chapter 5.6.  
𝐵𝐶𝑅 =  
 (𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 ×  𝐾𝑃𝐼 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚) + 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡
 
Equation 9: The calculation of benefit-cost ratio (McIntosh, Li 2012), adopted by the author. 
To calculate the cumulative monetary effects of traffic safety program, the effects of crashes 
(KPIcrashes), accidents (KPIaccidents), injuries (KPIinjuries), and fatalities (KPIfatalities), will be 
monetized by the values crash (Ccrash), accident (Caccident), injuries (Cinjurie), fatalities (Cfatalitie) 
and summarized as illustrated in Equation 10. The results are presented in chapter 5.6. 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 × 𝐾𝑃𝐼 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑚 = (𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑠 × 𝐶𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑠ℎ) +
(𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 × 𝐶𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡) + (𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 × 𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑒) + (𝐾𝑃𝐼𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 × 𝐶𝑓𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒)  
Equation 10: The monetization of benefits (McIntosh, Li 2012), adopted by the author. 
Adverted Social Cost includes all negative effects and costs related to KPI (McIntosh, Li 
2012), for details, see Table 7. The annual revenues of the speed camera program of Table 6 
are summed and added to the benefits. All monetary calculations are rounded to full euros 
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4. Data 
In the data section, the Estonian speed camera and traffic safety program is introduced with 
the accident data and dynamics form 2003 to 2017. The program inputs and costs are divided 
into the prevention costs, the development and maintenance costs of speed camera 
infrastructure, the software development costs for written warning procedure, the control 
costs, the costs of consequences, and the revenue from written warning procedure. 
4.1 The Estonian speed camera program 
According to the Estonian Road Administration (ERA), on December 1, 2017, 66 measuring 
cabins are on the national roads of Estonia as shown in Table 2, of which four can measure 
the speed in both directions. Also, the ERA has two-speed cameras in the city of Tallinn. 
ERA uses 47-speed cameras, which are reposted from time to time between the measuring 
cabins. The study uses road accident data that is within one-kilometer range of areas covered 
by speed cameras. The locations of speed camera measuring cabins are shown in Figure 2. 
The speed camera system and written warning procedure only affect the roads covered by the 
speed cameras (Table 2). International studies have shown that the speed cameras have the 
most effective spatial coverage on average 500m before and after a speed camera (Li, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2: The locations of Estonian Speed Cameras (ERA, 2018).
2
 
                                               
2
 Map of speed camera locations (ERA 2018): http://tanel.jairus.ee/kiiruskaamerad.html 
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Table 2: The location, number and year of implementation of Estonian speed cameras. 
Road No of camera 
measurement cabins 
Operational year 
Tallinn-Tartu-Võru-Luhamaa 24 2011 
Tallinn-Pärnu-Ikla 11 2011 
Tallinn-Narva 11 2013 
Ääsmäe-Haapsalu-Rohuküla 4 2014 
Saku-Laagri 1 2014 
Tallinn-Rannamõisa-Kloogaranna 4 2014 
Tallinn-Rapla-Türi 5 2014 
Tallinn-Paldiski 4 2016 
Risti-Virtsu-Kuivastu (excluded) 2 2017 
Tallinn at Kristiine crossing (excluded) 2 2017 
Total 68  
Source: ERA (2018)
3
, compiled by the author. 
The Risti-Virtsu-Kuivastu and Kristiine crossing speed cameras are excluded from this thesis 
as these have been installed in December of 2017 and don’t have annual data for doing BA 
analysis. 
4.2 The Estonian Road Safety Program 
The Estonian Traffic Safety Program 2016-2025 aims to reduce traffic accidents to less than 
40 people per year and the number of injured, three consecutive years on average, down to 
330 people per year. The traffic accidents data for this thesis acquired from the Police and 
Border Guard Board (PBGB), Estonian Road Administration (ERA) and Estonian Traffic 
Insurance Fund (ETIF). Table 3 presents the number of minor crashes (Crash), serious traffic 
accidents (Acc) with fatalities (Fat) or at least one person injured (Inj) between 2003 and 
2017. To illustrate the implementation and dynamics of the Estonian road safety program 
2003-2015 the Figure 3 and 4 presents the annual change in observed categories. A minor 
crash is an accident where there is an only financial loss. The serious accident must have at 
least one person injured. Fatalities are all cases where a person dies as a result of a traffic 
accident on the spot or within 30 days in a hospital. All persons who are in stationary care for 
more than 24 hours are considered injured (Traffic Year 2016). 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
3
 Locations of speed cameras (ERA 2018): https://www.mnt.ee/eng/roads/cameras-speed-limit-
enforcement/camera-locations 
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Table 3: The number of traffic accidents and consequences from 2003 – 2017. 
KPI 
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Crash 3644 3978 3886 4780 4687 4205 3341 3248 2989 2928 3022 3227 3351 3107 3234 
Acc 1675 2201 2340 2585 2442 1851 1193 1177 1475 1377 1373 1425 1374 1462 1407 
Fat 131 167 171 206 197 125 85 76 92 84 79 77 67 71 48 
Inj 2184 2811 3029 3515 3254 2357 1482 1466 1880 1704 1704 1732 1719 1842 1727 
Total 5319 6179 6226 7365 7129 6056 4534 4425 4464 4305 4395 4652 4725 4569 4641 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
 
 
Figure 3: Dynamics of traffic accident fatalities from 2003 to 2017 from Police and Border 
Guard Board, compiled by the author. 
 
Figure 4: Dynamics of crashes, serious traffic accidents and injuries since 2003 to 2017 from 
Police and Border Guard Board, compiled by the author. 
A classic measure of speed control is the speed measurement of the speed by police patrols. 
The disadvantage of this measure is its short-term effectiveness. Estonia has not enough 
resources to measure the speed of vehicles on every dangerous road section (Prooses 2007). 
From 2009, an automatic speed control system and a written warning procedure have been 
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developed to address this shortcoming. This system installed on the most dangerous sections 
of the road. It is traffic calming preventive measure to reduce road accidents due to excessive 
speed (Traffic Safety Program 2003-2015). 
Overall traffic offense costs fall into three categories: prevention costs, control costs, and 
consequence costs. The corresponding costs, in turn, are divided into tangible and intangible 
costs (McIntosh, Li 2012). Historical research data cover the control costs and consequence 
costs. This work focuses on the prevention costs of traffic accidents. There are insufficient 
studies on prevention costs in Estonia (Kallaste et al. 2015: p.127). 
4.3 The prevention costs 
All investments that reduce the number of harmful events are considered as prevention costs. 
These would be the development and maintenance costs of speed camera infrastructure and 
related software (see Equation 8). The relevant data acquired from Estonian Electronic 
Procurement Registry (e-PPR) and Estonian Road Administration. 
4.3.1 The development and maintenance costs of speed camera infrastructure 
Altogether, on the dangerous road sections, by 2017, 68 measurement cabins and 47-speed 
cameras are operated, with a total cost of 4 083 060 euros according to the e-PPR. The 
corresponding costs are the purchase of equipment, maintenance, relocation of cameras and 
infrastructure connections like electricity and communications. The infrastructure costs are 
characterized by Appendix 1. 
4.3.2 The Software development costs for written warning procedure 
According to the e-PPR, the cost of software development and maintenance for written 
warning procedure is 645 495 euros. It includes the creation of an information system, 
interfacing with other information systems, purchasing hardware and continuing development 
work. The cost of the written alert information system is characterized by Appendix 2. 
4.4 The control costs 
In this study, the control costs are all costs related to the work of misdemeanors. This 
includes wages, office and equipment costs. According to the wage and labor data published 
by the Ministry of Finance, the average gross salary for the respective position presented in 
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characterized in Appendix 3 and is 1255 euros per month. The total monthly cost to the 
public sector, with the national labor tax (33%), is therefore 1679 euros per month. 
According to the police, a particular unit is working on automatic speed enforcement 
infringements. As a result, the annual salary of the job is 1679 euros multiplied with 12 
months and 12 posts (in 2017), and that is 80 592 euros. The estimated total cost of one a 
workplace is 2968 euros per month according to the public document registry of ERA 
(2018)
4
. It includes all the costs related to the office workplace like security, electricity, 
internet, heating and payments by PBGB to the office building owners and to the other 
important service providers. Working equipment is 500 euros for a four year period per one 
official.  
4.5 The costs of consequences 
In this thesis, the costs of crashes, accidents, fatalities, and injuries to society are acquired 
from other authors (Koppel et al. 2005). The costs of consequences are divided into two parts 
- tangible and intangible costs.  
The tangible costs are the cost of treatment for the hospitals and to the victims, the cost of 
temporary or permanent incapacity to work for the Social Insurance Board. In the event of a 
fatal road accident, the costs are the survivor's benefit (dependents) and funeral expenses 
(Koppel et al. 2005; McIntosh, Li 2012).  
The intangible costs are the loss of future income, the cost of the psychological suffering for 
the deaths of loved ones, and for the employer the loss of production caused by the death of a 
worker (Koppel et al. 2005; McIntosh, Li 2012).  
All these variables are taken into account by Koppel et al. (2005) and are included in the cost 
model in Table 4 and will not be disaggregated in this thesis (for details look, Koppel 2005). 
Table 4 illustrates the costs of fatalities, injuries, and accidents. As the values were calculated 
in 2005 by Koppel, the costs are upgraded to meet the 2017 values. For this reason the 
previous costs of fatalities, injuries and accidents are updated by using the annual growth of 
GDP. Unfortunately, there is no data to add to the minor crashes column.  
  
                                               
4
 Estonian Road Administration, 2016, Public documents registry: 1-21/16-00026/117; 
https://adr.mkm.ee/?id=AF5E49C74039089FC225805E002B536F 
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Table 4: The cost of fatalities, injuries, and accidents in euros. 
Year GDP GDP Growth Fatalities Injured Accident 
2003 6 353,50 12,73% 456 874 11 941 7 165 
2004 7 124,60 12,14% 506 872 9 635 6 607 
2005 8 313,00 16,68% 568 389 10 804 7 409 
2006 10 039,80 20,77% 663 198 12 607 8 644 
2007 12 118,00 20,70% 800 959 15 225 10 440 
2008 12 353,10 1,94% 966 754 18 377 12 601 
2009 10 600,00 -14,19% 985 510 18 733 12 846 
2010 11 052,80 4,27% 845 651 16 075 11 023 
2011 12 556,20 13,60% 881 774 16 762 11 493 
2012 13 559,30 7,99% 1 001 713 19 041 13 057 
2013 14 364,40 5,94% 1 081 739 20 563 14 100 
2014 15 036,60 4,68% 1 145 969 21 784 14 937 
2015 15 478,10 2,94% 1 199 596 22 803 15 636 
2016 16 034,70 3,60% 1 234 818 23 473 16 095 
2017 17 463,40 8,91% 1 279 222 24 317 16 674 
Source: Koppel (2005) and Statistics Estonia (2018), updated by the author 
Table 5 illustrates the accident and insurance payment data of Estonian Traffic Insurance 
Fund (ETIF). It contains all traffic insurance cases, annual average cost of all car related 
insurance cases and the annual average cost of all personal insurance cases related to traffic 
accidents. The insurance data is included to assess the direct monetary impact of speed 
cameras. 
Table 5: The number and cost of traffic insurance cases in euros. 
Year Annual 
insurance cases 
in numbers 
The average cost of 
car insurance case 
in euros 
The average cost of 
personal damage 
insurance case 
in euros 
The average 
insurance 
compensation for 
fatality 
in euros 
2007 33126 1 597 2 868 12 012 
2008 30116 1 622 3 049 28 618 
2009 26750 1 453 2 997 21 813 
2010 31752 1 344 4 923 12 257 
2011 29793 1 324 6 298 48 717 
2012 30706 1 351 2 571 55 343 
2013 31231 1 351 4 003 59 765 
2014 31061 1 485 4 585 63 313 
2015 32506 1 468 4 236 66 276 
2016 35392 1 542 3 602 68 222 
2017 35662 1 616 3 786 70 676 
Source: ETIF (2017)
5
, compiled by the author. 
                                               
5
 https://www.lkf.ee/et/statistika 
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For calculating the safety effects of speed camera program the accident data from Police and 
Border Guard Board is used. Detailed accident data and calculations of observed roads are 
available in appendix 6. 
4.6 Revenue from written warning procedure 
A written warning procedure gives offenders virtually automatic warning penalties. This 
process is not entirely automatic for legal reasons as the fine needs controlling and the 
decision needs a digital signature for a misdemeanor or, in the event of problems or 
significant infringement, the process interference. The fiscal benefit per year illustrated in 
Table 6. The topic, included in this thesis, is to look at the proportion of the respective 
revenue component to the total cost of prevention. 
Table 6: The revenue in euros and the number of cases in written warning procedure. 
Year Revenue in euros Number of written warnings 
2013 909 410 43 100 
2014 1 885 653 89 793 
2015 2 188 824 103 353 
2016 2 253 608 106 412 
2017 2 314 332 109 684 
Total 9 551 827  
Source: Police and Border Guard Board, compiled by the author. 
5. Results and discussion 
This chapter identifies the cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost ratio of the camera program and 
compares the results with the other studies. 
5.1 The scope of the analysis 
The scope of analysis in this thesis involves key performance indicators of road safety. The 
minor crashes and traffic accidents with human casualties (injuries, fatalities) on the main 
roads with speed camera installment. The accident data is compared with before and after the 
speed camera installment on the observed roads. The calculations take into account the 
accident trend on comparison roads, RTM effect, and separate it from the accident statistics 
of the observed roads. 
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5.2 Inputs 
To calculate the effects of speed cameras on the observed road the before-and-after method 
with comparison group used. Whether, the comparison group, is suitable, the odds ratio 
calculated for all roads and their control groups. As noted in the literature review static speed 
cameras have the highest effective range around 500m, and after 1000m the effects are 
similar to no treatment zones (Li et al. 2013).  
The control groups are on the same road as this is the best solution regarding road conditions 
to camera treatment zones. As the observed roads are the main arterial links between different 
places in Estonia, thus there are no similar alternative roads for comparison. An alternative is 
to use the regional or national traffic trends, but these gave weaker odd ratios than selected 
comparison road sections.  
For making before-and-after analysis, the Appendix 5 and Appendix 6 are compared. The 
results are presented in Table 7. The camera enforcement zone data Appendix 5 contains 
accidents (Acc), fatalities (Fat) and persons injured in accidents (Inj) on the observed roads. 
The accident data is available from its location on the road kilometer basis. The data is 
combined annually (from 2003 to 2017) to flatten seasonal, weather, day and night random 
fluctuations in accidents recommended by Hirst et al. (2004). The accident data is combined 
with the speed camera locations data by adding the speed camera location to accident data 
and selecting annual accidents before and after the speed camera in 1000m range.  
The comparison group has built on similar principles as Appendix 6. It contains accidents 
(Acc), fatalities (Fat) and persons injured in accidents (Inj) on the observed roads. The 
comparison road is selected so that between the speed camera enforcement zone and 
comparison sections is at least 2000 m buffer zone for eliminating any spillover effects. The 
selected road type and traffic flows are similar to speed camera zones. Mostly the four-lane 
highways are excluded from comparison group because of the very different road 
characteristics. 
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Table 7: The results of the before-and-after analysis with the comparison group. 
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Tallinn-
Tartu-Võru-
Luhamaa 
Acc 56 7 118 8 -45.8% -44.2% -1.5% 58 -2 1.01 
Fat 2 7 25 8 -90.9% -40.6% -50.3% 13 -11  
Inj 100 7 231 8 -50.5% -38.7% -11.8% 124 -24  
Tallinn-
Pärnu-Ikla 
Acc 33 7 61 8 -38.2% -36.7% -1.4% 34 -1 0.99 
Fat 5 7 14 8 -59.2% -40.7% -18.4% 7 -2  
Inj 59 7 83 8 -18.8% -53.4% 34.6% 34 25  
Tallinn-
Narva 
Acc 18 5 87 10 -58.6% -40.3% -18.3% 26 -8 1.36 
Fat 2 5 20 10 -80.0% -30.9% -49.1% 7 -5  
Inj 36 5 130 10 -44.6% -37.4% -7.2% 41 -5  
Ääsmäe-
Haapsalu-
Rohuküla 
Acc 4 4 17 11 -35.3% -11.9% -23.4% 5 -1 1.08 
Fat 0 4 7 11 -100.0% -51.5% -48.5% 1 -1  
Inj 4 4 29 11 -62.1% -3.8% -58.3% 10 -6  
Saku-Laagri Acc 2 4 3 11 83.3% 175.0% -91.7% 3 -1 0.60 
Fat 0 4 0 11 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0  
Inj 2 4 4 11 37.5% 175.0% -137.5% 4 -2  
Tallinn-
Rannamõisa-
Kloogaranna 
Acc 6 4 23 11 -28.3% -14.1% -14.2% 7 -1 1.01 
Fat 1 4 4 11 -31.3% 37.5% -68.8% 6 -5  
Inj 7 4 25 11 -23.0% -21.9% -1.1% 7 0  
Tallinn-
Rapla-Türi 
Acc 3 4 30 11 -72.5% -27.1% -45.4% 8 -5 1.98 
Fat 0 4 8 11 -100.0% -78.8% -21.2% 0 0  
Inj 4 4 61 11 -82.0% -19.2% -62.8% 18 -14  
Tallinn-
Paldiski 
Acc 2 2 35 13 -62.9% -41.4% -21.4% 3 -1 1.04 
Fat 0 2 4 13 -100.0% -67.5% -32.5% 1 -1  
Inj 2 2 38 13 -65.8% -53.6% -12.2% 3 -1  
Totals (T) 
Average (A) 
Means 
Acc 124 5 374 10 -42.0% -31.9% -19.9% 
 
-20 1.03 
Fat 10 5 82 10 -85.4% -40.7% -40.5% 
 
-25  
Inj 214 5 601 10 -47.6% -29.6% -12.0% 
 
-26  
 
T A T A Mean Mean Mean 
 
T Mean 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
The comparison results in Table 7 are combined over the road speed camera sections as the 
aim is to find the cumulative effects of all speed cameras together. It is possible to look at the 
performance of individual cameras, but this work goes out of the scope of this thesis. The 
results table contains accidents (Acc), fatalities (Fat) and persons injured in accidents (Inj) on 
the observed roads. The comparison is built up by observing accidents, fatalities and injured 
numbers before (tB) and after a period (tA) in years. The first result is a naïve before-and-
after comparison (Naïve BA of cams) that usually overestimates the real effects of speed 
cameras (Hirst et al. 2004; Persaud et al. 2007).  
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The overall traffic safety trend or effects of other measures implemented has not 
disaggregated from the results. The second result (control group road trend) is the overall 
trend effect or the effects of other traffic safety measures implemented. The third is the net 
effects of the observed speed camera sections. The section of expected accidents will show 
what would have been the accident, fatalities of injured rate if the speed cameras would not 
have implemented. The camera effects in numbers show the effect in numbers calculated by 
using Equation 6. The odds ratio is calculated by using Equation 3 and shows the 
comparability of the observed camera sections and the comparison group. The most results 
are in the range of 95% confidence level, and the mean result is 1.03. We can be confident 
that the road sections of comparison group are good enough to estimate the trend effect 
accurately. 
By removing the trend with comparison group the combined results are following: the overall 
accident numbers are reduced in median by 19.8% or by 20 accidents. The reduction is 
similar (19%) to Jones et al. (2008) with 29 mobile camera network and Goldenbeld and van 
Schagen (2005) results (21%) with 28 mixed cameras network. Later used similar 
observation method, the BA with an experimental (targeted speed enforcement) and a 
comparison (no targeted speed enforcement) condition. Gains et al. (2004) with the 
observation of 2300 cameras in 23 sites got a crash reduction of 22% and used simple BA 
method and EB for removing the RTM. Other author’s results, in the literature review, are on 
average 10% higher or lower.  
The number of fatalities has fallen in median by 40.51% or by 25 in numbers and is near the 
result (44%) of the Jones et al. (2008). Shin et al. (2009) with six static cameras network had 
slightly higher fatalities reduction (46-56%) and also used the BA method with comparison 
groups. Other author’s results with different methods in the literature review are on average 
twice as low.  
The injured rate has fallen in median by 12% and by 26 in numbers over the combined 
observation period ranging from two to seven years. The comparable result (11%) were only 
by Mountain et al. (2004) with 62 static cameras system which used EB method. Other 
authors got approximately 10-15% higher injuries reduction rates. 
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5.3 Monetization of the inputs 
The cost of a prevention program is the building and management of a camera network, the 
procurement and management of a written warning information system and the cost of the 
processors' work. The cost of the speed cameras program can be found by adding the costs of 
infrastructure, software, and Police (Equation 8). The total cost of speed camera 
infrastructure is 4 083 260 euros (see Appendix 1). The total cost of the written warning 
information system is 645 495 euros, including the software component of 547 442 euros (see 
Appendix 2).  
The Police work payments costs are illustrated in Table 8, and is calculated by publicized 
public sector payroll data (Ministry of Finance, 2018) (see Appendix 3), the office and the 
equipment costs are calculated by using the workplace and equipment cost from data chapter 
4.4. The cumulative total control costs are summed up from 2011 to 2017. The total cost of 
maintaining the written warning procedure since it started is 4 381 252 euros. 
Table 8: The annual control cost of written warning procedure. 
 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 
Payroll 262 971 255 312 223 029 215 445 208 118 201 041 194 204 
Workplace 438 867 426 084 413 301 400 902 388 875 377 209 365 893 
Equipment   5 000    5 000 
Totals 701 838 681 396 641 331 616 347 596 993 578 250 565 097 
Sources: The Ministry of Finance (2017) and ERA (2018), compiled by the author. 
When converting inputs to money, we use the cost of crashes, accidents, fatalities and injured 
(Table 4 and Table 5) and multiply it with the effects from the results of Table 7. As the 
camera programme is a running project and cameras are installed at different times, all the 
effects and periods are road based, but the results are summed up as the new camera sections 
are implemented. The primary interest is the total effect of the current program not on the 
individual roads. 
Table 4 illustrates the costs of fatalities, injuries, and accidents. As the values were calculated 
in 2005 by Koppel, the costs have obviously changed in 2017. For this reason the previous 
costs of fatalities, injuries and accidents are updated by using the annual growth of SKP. The 
previous costs calculated by Koppel (2005) are hypothetical as this cost will not always 
realize accurately. On the other hand, the costs of Estonian Traffic Insurance Fund (ETIF) are 
more direct (Table 5). This is the actual money spent for compensating the consequences of 
accidents. When comparing the overall accident data (Table 3) with the results of ETIF data 
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(Table 5), we can see that the combined accident rate with Police involvement account is on 
average 15.44% and 14.65% in the median of all traffic-related insurance cases. The crashes 
share 10.78% on average and 10.23% in the median. 
When monetizing the KPI-s, using Equation 10, the results of combined periods of the 
observed roads are in Table 9.  
Table 9: The cost of accident, fatalities, and injuries by ETIF and Koppel (2005). 
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Tallinn-Tartu-
Võru-
Luhamaa 
Acc 7 -2 1 448 14 570 2 317 23 312 
Fat 7 -11 61 759 1 117 833 679 349 12 296 163 
Inj 7 -24 4 154 21 249 98 881 505 810 
Tallinn-Pärnu-
Ikla 
Acc 7 -1 1 448 14 570 1 112 11 188 
Fat 7 -2 61 759 1 117 833 139 530 2 525 475 
Inj 7 25 4 154 21 249 -104 406 -534 068 
Tallinn-Narva Acc 5 -8 1 492 15 488 11 898 123 514 
Fat 5 -5 65 650 1 188 269 322 282 5 833 321 
Inj 5 -5 4 042 22 588 19 013 106 251 
Ääsmäe-
Haapsalu-
Rohuküla 
Acc 4 -1 1 528 15 836 2 210 22 908 
Fat 4 -1 67 122 1 214 901 82 915 1 500 760 
Inj 4 -6 4 052 23 094 24 920 142 028 
Saku-Laagri Acc 4 -1 1 528 15 836 1 528 15 836 
Fat 4 0 67 122 1 214 901 0 0 
Inj 4 -2 4 052 23 094 8 104 46 188 
Tallinn-
Rannamõisa-
Kloogaranna 
Acc 4 -1 1 528 15 836 1 815 18 805 
Fat 4 -5 67 122 1 214 901 335 610 6 074 505 
Inj 4 0 4 052 23 094 414 2 362 
Tallinn-Rapla-
Türi 
Acc 4 -5 1 528 15 836 7 571 78 460 
Fat 4 0 67 122 1 214 901 0 0 
Inj 4 -14 4 052 23 094 56 415 321 530 
Tallinn-
Paldiski 
Acc 2 -1 1 579 16 674 1 821 19 228 
Fat 2 -1 69 449 1 257 020 69 449 1 257 020 
Inj 2 -1 3 694 24 317 2 639 17 369 
Totals (T), 
Averages (A), 
Means (M) 
Acc 5 -20 1 510 15 581 30 271 313 251 
Fat 5 -25 65 888 1 192 570 1 629 135 29 487 243 
Inj 5 -26 4 032 22 722 105 980 607 471 
 
A Total Average Average 1 765 387 30 407 965 
Source: ETIF (2018) and Koppel (2005), compiled by the author. 
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In total, the 20 avoided accidents could have saved 313 251 euros, the 25 avoided fatalities 
could have saved 29 487 243 euros, and the 26 avoided severe accidents could have saved 
607 471 euros from the start of the speed camera program. Unfortunately, there are no 
detailed data available about the minor crashes on the roads observed, and thus the cost of 
these should be measured in future research. In this thesis, we can give some rough estimates 
about these costs by assuming that the observed relationship (Table 1) between minor crashes 
and accidents with at least one injured is on average 2.18. It gives us a rough estimation that 
57 minor crashes could have been avoided, and the savings for society could be 26 multiplied 
with 2.18 multiplied with 1510 euros equals 85 587 euros for the period. If we compare this 
with the overall insurance cases statistics, then the number could be ten times higher as the 
relationship between the crashes and overall insurance cases is 10.78% on average. 
Unfortunately, there is not this type of data available on observed period, and thus it is not 
presented. 
Table 9 is composed by taking the period of the implemented speed camera section and 
taking the average cost of accidents, fatalities, and injuries by the same period from Tables 4 
and 5, and multiplying it with the combined effects of observed road sections. 
Table 10: The number of camera measurement cabins and the cost of speed cameras in euros. 
Observed road Number of camera 
measurement cabins 
The cost of speed cameras 
in euros 
Tallinn-Narva 11 1 473 678 
Tallinn-Tartu-Võru-Luhamaa 24 3 215 297 
Tallinn-Pärnu-Ikla 11 1 473 678 
Ääsmäe-Haapsalu-Rohuküla 4 535 883 
Saku-Laagri 1 133 971 
Tallinn-Rannamõisa-Kloogaranna 4 535 883 
Tallinn-Rapla-Türi 5 669 853 
Tallinn-Paldiski 4 535 883 
Total 64 8 574 124 
Source: ERA (2018)
6
, compiled by the author. 
The total cost of the prevention program is currently 9 110 007 euros by using Equation 7. 
The cost per speed camera measurement cabin can found by dividing the total cost by the top-
                                               
6
 Camera Locations: https://www.mnt.ee/eng/roads/cameras-speed-limit-enforcement/camera-locations 
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down method with the number of measuring points. 9 110 007 euros divided by 68 equals 
133 971 euros. As 64 measuring cabins are located on the roads under observation, the cost of 
speed cameras is divided between the number of camera measurement cabins and costs are in 
Table 10. The cost of the speed camera network under observation is 8 574 124 euros. 
5.4 The desired effects 
To meet the target set by the Traffic Safety Program 2016 - 2025, the number of fatalities in 
traffic accidents has to reduced fewer than 40 per year, and the injured has to reduce on the 
average of three consequential years less than 330. The Table 11 illustrates the relationship in 
percentage between the overall national traffic accidents (NAcc), fatalities (NFat) and injured 
(NInj) to the observed roads traffic accidents (ObRAcc), fatalities (ObRFat) and injured 
(ObRInj). The KPI ratios of the roads under observation are on average, 11.43% (median 
11.68%) on accidents, 26.54% (27.08% median) for fatalities and on 13.61% (median 
13.95%) on injured.  
When looking the general traffic safety trend with fatalities, we can see that the number has 
dropped from an average of 145 on before 2011 to on average 74 after 2011 and the drop is 
71. When we compare it with the average share of the observed roads 26.54% on fatalities, 
then we see the estimate is 19 saved lives. 
When we compare the median levels of 167 before 2011 and 77 after 2011 we get the 
difference of 90 lives and the median share is 27.08% and thus the treatment effect is 24 
saved lives. It is almost similar to measurements in Table 11 (25 lives saved).  
When we compare the general traffic safety trend with injuries we can see that the number 
has dropped from an average of 2512 on before the period of 2003 to 2011 to on average 
1758 of them after a period from 2011 to 2017 and the drop is 754. When we compare it with 
the average share of the observed roads, 13.61% we see the estimated share should be is 103 
less injured. The measured combined effect was 26. By looking at the historical data, we can 
see that the accident and injuries rates have been settled down to relatively stabilized levels 
since 2008 to 2017. Thus the expected speed camera system effects for preventing accidents 
and injuries should be expectedly low. However, when looking the reduction of fatalities, we 
can assume that the effect could be enough to prevent fatalities. 
  
 Table 11: The accidents, fatalities, and injuries on the observed roads and the ratio in percentage from national accidents, fatalities and injuries 
statistics before and after the speed camera program deployment. 
 
Roads 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
ObRAcc Acc 162 257 328 379 342 226 151 139 153 154 129 123 113 179 151 
ObRFat Fat 38 41 55 67 50 22 14 31 24 26 22 14 19 15 13 
ObRInj Inj 240 428 464 575 488 339 218 204 222 253 209 175 196 255 241 
NAcc Acc 1675 2201 2340 2585 2442 1851 1193 1177 1475 1377 1373 1425 1374 1462 1407 
NFat Fat 131 167 171 206 197 125 85 76 92 84 79 77 67 71 48 
NInj Inj 2184 2811 3029 3515 3254 2357 1482 1466 1880 1704 1704 1732 1719 1842 1727 
ObR/N(Acc) Acc 9.7% 11.7% 14.0% 14.7% 14.0% 12.2% 12.7% 11.8% 10.4% 11.2% 9.4% 8.6% 8.2% 12.2% 10.7% 
ObR/N(Fat) Fat 29.0% 24.6% 32.2% 32.5% 25.4% 17.6% 16.5% 40.8% 26.1% 31.0% 27.8% 18.2% 28.4% 21.1% 27.1% 
ObR/N(Inj) Inj 11.0% 15.2% 15.3% 16.4% 15.0% 14.4% 14.7% 13.9% 11.8% 14.8% 12.3% 10.1% 11.4% 13.8% 14.0% 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
 
  
 5.5 Comparison of inputs with impacts and conclusions on cost-effectiveness 
For finding the cost-effectiveness of the speed camera program, the corresponding cost of the 
camera program must be summed up over the years before-and-after the analysis and 
compared on average and by the end of the year with the number of accidents, fatalities, and 
injuries. The KPI ratios of the roads under observation are on average, 11.43% (median 
11.68%) on accidents (20), 26.54% (27.08% median) for fatalities (25) and on 13.61% 
(median 13.95%) on injured (26) when compared to the national levels. 
Cost-effectiveness (CE) is found by dividing the total cost of the program with the avoidable 
accidents which included the fatalities or at least one seriously injuries person over the full 
program period. In this case, the CE has limited application. The deaths and injuries are direct 
consequences of the accident. We have to combine these all together and then we can present 
it as the reduction of a serious accident that would have also caused on average 1.3 fatalities 
and 1.25 injured persons. 
𝐶𝐸 =  
8 574 124 euros 
20 accidents  
=  428 706 euros 
CE can be used to compare the effectiveness of the alternative programs to find the most 
effective way to avoid the one severe accident with on average of 1.25 fatalities and 1.3 
injured persons (Chisholm 2000; Welsh, Farrington 2000; McIntosh, Li 2012).  
The interest of society is the reduction of the fatalities and injured influenced by the program. 
In this context, the average decrease in the number of fatalities and injuries on the roads 
equipped with speed cameras has been higher than it could be according to the BA study (see 
Table 7). Several other factors such as driver risk behavior, road conditions, road 
construction, traffic Police supervision, and then static speed cameras on hazardous sections 
play a role in road safety (Elvik, 1997; Mountain et al. 2004; Hirst et al. 2004). We can 
identify the increased safety of roads under the overall road safety trend. As prevention is the 
primary focus of the road safety program, the combination of all measures must increase 
overall road safety. The benefits of road sections surveyed in the study have decreased the 
number of fatalities and injuries before and after the implementation of the speed camera 
program, which is characterized by Table 7. 
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5.6 Calculating the benefit-cost ratio and making the conclusions to society 
During the effectiveness analysis in Table 7, the impact of the speed camera program could 
be less than 20 accidents, 25 fatalities, 26 injured and 57 crashes. The speed cameras were 
introduced at different times, and the analysis has been done through the whole deployment 
period. In order to calculate the BCR, the combined costs of KPIs must be divided into the 
corresponding investments in Table 8 using the Equation 8. 
When we look only the avoidable insurance data from Table 9, and we do not introduce the 
revenue, we get the benefit-cost ratio 1 (BCR1). The serious accidents and minor crashes are 
combined and multiplied by the average cost of car insurance case. There is no differentiation 
in accident seriousness by the available data. The 77 accidents multiplied with the 1510 euros 
equals a 116 270 euros. The total cost of 26 seriously injured persons for insurance is 105 980 
euros. The total cost of 25 fatalities for insurance is 1 629 135 euros. By using Equation 9, 
from chapter 3.3, the benefit-cost ratio is shown in BCR1. 
𝐵𝐶𝑅1  =  
 116 270 + 105 980 + 1 629 135
8 574 124
=  0.21 
In the direct costs approach results (BCR1) the program is using more resources then it should 
help to save. If we introduce the revenues of written warning procedure from Table 6, then 
we add an additional amount of 9 551 827 euros, and the result is shown in BCR2.  
𝐵𝐶𝑅2  =  
 113 071 + 101 443 + 1 543 974 + 9 551 827 
8 574 124
=  1.32 
We can see that the revenue covers all the expenses of the speed camera program and adds 
additional 977 703 euros to state revenues. All the studies observed in literature review did 
not include the revenue analysis. We can see that the minimal direct net benefit for society is 
at least 0.32 euros with the corresponding one euro investment. 
For calculating the BCR by using the averted societal costs of Koppel (2005) from Table 9, 
the calculated benefit to society is 313 251 euros per 20 accidents, 29 487 243 euros per 25 
fatalities, 607 471 euros per 26 injured persons and 86 070 euros per 57 minor crashes. The 
combined benefit for society is 30 407 965 euros. The benefit-cost ratio 3 is shown in BCR3. 
𝐵𝐶𝑅3  =  
 313 251 + 29 487 243 + 607 471 + 86 070
8 574 124  
=  3.55 
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The BCR3 without the written warning revenue is 3.55. In this case, the society saves extra 
2.55 euros per every euro invested into the speed camera program. When we introduce the 
revenues of written warning procedure, we get following results in BCR4. 
𝐵𝐶𝑅4  =  
 309 760 + 29 706 725 + 587 288 + 84 567 + 9 551 827 
8 574 124
=  4.66 
The combined hypothetical net benefits are up to 3.66 euros per every euro invested. 4.66 is 
near the result (1:5) of the Hess and Polak (2007). 
For taking into account the regression-to-mean effect (RTM) for BCR2 and BCR4. We expect 
it to be 10% as described by Goldenbeld and van Schagen (2005). In this case, we subtract 
10% from the combined results of Averted Societal costs and get the new results: 
𝐵𝐶𝑅2−𝑅𝑇𝑀  =  
 (1 765 387 × 0,9) + 9 551 827 
8 574 124
=  1.30 
𝐵𝐶𝑅4−𝑅𝑇𝑀  =  
 (30 407 965 × 0,9) + 9 551 827 
8 574 124
=  4.31 
As we can see, the BCR did not change much. However, when the RTM effect is greater, 
then it can affect the calculation considerably and can mislead to allocate funds to further 
investments in road safety programs that are not as beneficial as presented.  
Although the number of accidents and injured people in traffic increased over the last four 
years, the number of cars and traffic volume has also increased, according to the ERA. At the 
same time, the number of people killed in traffic has fallen far more than according to general 
statistical trends could be expected.  
The first limitation of this thesis is that the RTM effect is not calculated separately. The 
primary reason for this is the lack of data to make proper road accident model for Empirical 
Bayesian analysis. Thus this thesis should be further developed by evaluating the safety 
effects with more recent and technologically advanced models for simulating the future 
accident rates.  
The second limitation is that the net present value of the road safety investments for every 
camera installment is not calculated. The reason for this is also the lack of data, as the details 
of the contracts are treated as business secrets and are protected by the law. The only public 
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data available is through an electronic procurements registry (for more details look Appendix 
1). 
The third limitation is the available data quality. The current ERA, ETIF, PBGB statistics do 
not differentiate the seriousness of the injuries. Therefore it is not possible to calculate how 
many persons will recover fully from the accidents and how many will have permanent 
incapability after the accident. This has some extra future research opportunity to 
differentiate the seriousness of accidents by combining the accident data with the data from 
the Estonian Health Insurance Fund. 
The current speed camera network is using well studied and proven the older technology. The 
effective range of fixed speed cameras are around 500m (Li et al. 2013). This is a very 
limited range of treatment effect.  There are newer technical solutions available like average 
speed enforcement. Several studies have observed the effects of average speed enforcement, 
and the results are better in average speed compliance, public acceptance, and prevention of 
accident or fatalities rates (Soole et al. 2013). Estonian Road Administration should consider 
upgrading the current speed camera technology to average speed enforcement as some of the 
infrastructures can be reused when the current cameras will depreciate. 
Estonia is a small country and the traffic flows, and accident rates are relatively small. 
However, the observed results are similar to several studies using similar approaches (Gains 
et al. 2004; Mountain et al. 2004; Jones et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2009). The main caution of the 
estimates of this work is the possible regression-to-mean effect. By looking at the literature, it 
has been noted that the more extended datasets should diminish the randomness of accidents 
and thus the regression-to-mean (RTM) effect should be insignificant. Some researchers have 
postulated that within five year observation period will have RTM effect in a range of 5-10% 
(Goldenbeld, van Schagen 2005). For this thesis, the dataset is 15 years long, and thus we can 
argue confidently that the RTM effect is also in 5-10% range. If the RTM is in range of 10% 
the BCR is in range of 1.30 to 4.31 by using the corresponding calculations of BCR3 and 
BCR4. 
The main implication of this thesis is that the current speed camera program investment on 
observed roads has positive impacts. First, it has a considerable effect on reducing the 
fatalities - 25 lives saved. Secondary, the speeders have paid more fines than the program 
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costs. An extra 977 703 euros is added to state revenue. In that sense, the speed camera 
program is the road safety measure and the state revenue filler. 
6. Conclusions 
The aim of this thesis was to calculate the cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost ratio of the 
Estonian speed camera programme by combining the speed camera effectiveness methods 
with the crime prevention benefit-cost analysis methods. 
The speed camera programs have been extensively studied in the scientific literature for over 
30 years. The economic feasibility view of these works is missing or is a side product of 
some works (Hess and Polak, 2007; Shin et al. 2009; Newstead and Cameron, 2003; Gains et 
al. 2004). Only two speed camera effectiveness studies have been done in Estonia (Draba 
2012; Äär 2014) but had no economic feasibility analysis. This thesis fills the economic 
feasibility analysis cap in Estonia’s case. 
This thesis analyses the data from the Estonian Road Administration, Police and Border 
Guard Board and Estonian Traffic Insurance Fund (ETIF). To find the speed camera 
effectiveness the before-and-after method with comparison group is used. To calculate the 
cost-effectiveness and benefit-cost ratios the crime prevention cost-effectiveness and benefit-
cost analysis methods are used and combined with the costs data of ETIF and updated 
calculations of Koppel et al. 2005. 
This thesis has similar results with several studies using similar approaches (Gains et al. 
2004; Mountain et al. 2004; Jones et al. 2008; Shin et al. 2009). The main caution is the exact 
regression-to-mean effect that should be calculated in future research. 
The cost-effectiveness shows that the cost of avoiding 20 accidents with the consequences of 
at least one 1.3 injured and 1.25 fatalities is about 428 706 euros. It can be used for auditing 
the current project and evaluate if there are more cost-effective ways to get similar or better 
results. 
Consequently, we can argue that the speed camera program is beneficial for society because 
the benefit-cost ratio is > 1. By removing the trend and RTM effect, the BCR is 4.31. 
However, the revenues earned by the camera network are higher than the total cost of the 
program. Thus the investment by the society is paid up entirely by the speeders, and 
- 42 - 
 
additional 977 703 euros is added to state revenue. Other benefits like 25 saved lives are 
basically supplementary.  
This work has several future research opportunities like calculating the exact RTF effect, 
finding out the net present value of the current speed camera program investment and 
disaggregating the accident data so that the seriousness of the accidents can be separately 
calculated. 
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7. Appendixes 
Appendix 1: Procurement costs of speed camera infrastructure 
This table would contain the real costs of contracts if the procurement fulfilled. The data 
collected from national electronic procurement registry by using keywords “kiiruskaamera,” 
and the relevant results extracted from the search result. The results are procurements and 
costs of speed camera system. 
Name of the procurement Contract cost in euros 
Kristiine kiiruskaamerate hooldus 2017-2018 32 376.00 
Harjumaa Harku vald Muraste kiiruskaamerate liitumisühenduse ehitamine 
LP2394, LP2393 12 274.30 
Statsionaarsete kiiruskaamerate ja mõõtekabiinide ost, paigaldus ja hooldus 361 441.77 
Kiiruskaamerate hooldusteenus 879 935.00 
Statsionaarsete kiiruskaamerate ost, paigaldus ja hooldus 295 202.44 
Statsionaarsete kiiruskaamerate ja mõõtekabiinide ost, paigaldus ning hooldus 769 686.55 
Kiiruskaamerate valveteenus 25 920.00 
Järva maakonna kiiruskaamerate mõõtekabiinide hooldustööd 01.02.2012 kuni 
31.12.2015 839.32 
Statsionaarsete kiiruskaamerate ost, paigaldus ja hooldus 789 280.00 
Kiiruskaamerate ümbertõstmise ja häirekõnedele reageerimise teenus 37 570.00 
Kiiruskaamerate valveteenus 12 884.59 
Statsionaarsete kiiruskaamerate ost ja paigaldus 865 850.09 
Total cost 4 083 260.06 
Source: Electronic procurement registry, compiled by the author. 
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Appendix 2:  Procurement costs of the written warning information system 
This table would contain the real costs of contracts if the procurement fulfilled. The data 
collected from national electronic procurement registry by using keywords 
“hoiatusmenetlus,” and the relevant results extracted from the search result. The results are 
procurements and costs of written warning information system and its infrastructure. 
Name of the software procurement Contract cost in euros 
Hoiatusmenetluse infosüsteem 75 614.77 
Hoiatusmenetluse ja menetluse infosüsteemide vahelise liidese arendustööd 34 895.76 
Hoiatusmenetluse infosüsteemi ja POLIS üldosa liidese arendustööd 10 302.56 
Politsei- ja Piirivalveameti hoiatusmenetluse infosüsteemi tarkvara hooldus- ja 
arendustööde tellimine 26 629.81 
Politsei- ja Piirivalveameti hoiatusmenetluse infosüsteemi tarkvara hooldus- ja 
jätkuarendustööde tellimine perioodiks 2015-2018. 400 000.00 
Software total cost 547 442.90 
Name of the hardware procurement  
Hoiatusmenetluse infosüsteemi kõrgkäideldava majutuskeskkonna loomiseks 
vajaliku riist- ja tarkvara hankimine 98 051.97 
The total cost of written warning procedure information system 645 494.87 
Source: The electronic procurement registry, compiled by the author. 
 
  
- 45 - 
 
Appendix 3: Salaries and jobs of the Police Offices 
Annual salary and posts in the written warning procedure. The officials’ names removed due 
to Estonian data protection law. The table contains job title and gross salaries in 2016. The 
total personnel cost for the employer (PBGB) is approximately 33% higher due to the state 
social tax.  
Organization Bureau Position 
Annual salary in 
euros 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus vanemspetsialist 10 956,07 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus vanemspetsialist 11 232,93 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus liikluspolitseinik 12 435,94 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus juhtivspetsialist 12 448,01 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus juhtivspetsialist 12 471,59 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus juhtivspetsialist 12 736,48 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus liikluspolitseinik 14 330,84 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus liikluspolitseinik 17 835,80 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus liikluspolitseinik 18 243,91 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus liikluspolitseinik 19 943,99 
Plitsei- ja Piirivalveamet liiklusmenetlusteenistus teenistuse vanem 25 055,68 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2018), compiled by the author. 
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Appendix 4: Traffic accidents with injuries or fatalities from 2003-2017  
The accidents, fatalities, and injuries on observed roads from 2003 to 2017. The grey colour 
marks the years when speed cameras were installed. 
Roads 
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Tallinn-
Tartu-Võru-
Luhamaa 
Acc 52 82 103 120 103 68 34 42 59 50 53 40 22 42 39 
Fat 8 13 14 22 17 5 6 6 10 7 4 3 4 1 0 
Inj 89 140 160 197 170 105 51 62 86 94 97 65 30 62 61 
Tallinn-
Pärnu-Ikla 
Acc 27 42 53 51 57 35 24 21 23 24 21 20 25 39 24 
Fat 7 6 13 7 11 4 3 5 2 5 3 5 6 3 2 
Inj 56 78 73 71 91 44 41 29 30 32 27 22 41 61 44 
Tallinn-
Narva 
Acc 43 57 99 116 91 48 41 45 35 37 24 30 36 52 44 
Fat 12 13 21 24 13 7 0 11 5 8 6 5 6 8 8 
Inj 51 90 132 169 141 93 57 65 51 57 38 49 79 73 72 
Ääsmäe-
Haapsalu-
Rohuküla 
Acc 11 19 16 18 16 16 9 7 12 5 5 10 1 12 17 
Fat 3 0 1 3 1 3 4 4 1 0 4 0 0 1 2 
Inj 12 27 20 35 24 19 8 13 17 10 6 12 2 14 28 
Saku-Laagri Acc 1 3 4 3 4 8 2 3 1 4 1 1 3 5 1 
Fat 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Inj 1 9 4 2 5 14 3 3 1 6 1 1 3 4 1 
Tallinn-
Rannamõisa-
Kloogaranna 
Acc 4 5 7 20 16 11 15 4 5 9 6 10 4 9 10 
Fat 0 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Inj 4 4 7 23 20 15 17 7 6 13 11 9 4 13 14 
Tallinn-
Rapla-Türi 
Acc 16 28 29 28 28 20 15 11 11 13 5 6 12 13 9 
Fat 7 5 3 4 2 1 0 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 1 
Inj 17 48 42 52 1 25 26 19 20 25 9 8 23 21 12 
Tallinn-
Paldiski 
Acc 8 21 17 23 27 20 11 6 7 12 14 6 10 7 7 
Fat 1 3 1 3 6 1 1 3 2 2 4 0 1 1 0 
Inj 10 32 26 26 36 24 15 6 11 16 20 9 14 7 9 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
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Appendix 5: Traffic accidents with injuries or fatalities from 2003-2017  
The traffic accidents, fatalities and injuries in the 1000 m range of the speed cameras. The 
grey colour marks the years when speed cameras were installed.  
Roads 
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Tallinn-
Tartu-Võru-
Luhamaa 
Acc 10 14 25 27 17 8 6 11 12 12 7 7 2 10 6 
Fat 1 4 3 9 2 2 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 
Inj 19 25 52 61 34 12 11 17 17 30 7 12 7 18 9 
Tallinn-
Pärnu-Ikla 
Acc 2 6 13 9 14 9 5 3 2 7 7 1 7 3 6 
Fat 1 1 3 2 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 2 0 0 
Inj 3 16 11 13 18 13 5 4 1 11 6 4 18 7 12 
Tallinn-
Narva 
Acc 10 5 13 13 14 10 8 7 4 3 2 6 4 1 5 
Fat 1 2 2 4 5 0 0 5 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Inj 14 7 19 20 15 26 11 9 4 5 5 12 10 1 8 
Ääsmäe-
Haapsalu-
Rohuküla 
Acc 3 0 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 
Fat 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inj 3 0 1 4 7 1 1 8 2 2 0 0 0 3 1 
Saku-Laagri Acc 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Fat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inj 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Tallinn-
Rannamõisa-
Kloogaranna 
Acc 1 1 0 2 3 5 5 0 2 3 1 2 2 1 1 
Fat 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Inj 1 1 0 4 5 4 5 0 1 3 1 2 2 1 2 
Tallinn-
Rapla-Türi 
Acc 1 2 3 5 4 4 3 1 3 2 2 0 0 2 1 
Fat 1 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Inj 0 2 3 10 8 6 8 1 10 7 6 0 0 3 1 
Tallinn-
Paldiski 
Acc 2 4 2 4 6 4 4 1 1 4 3 0 0 1 1 
Fat 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Inj 2 4 2 3 8 4 4 1 1 6 3 0 0 1 1 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
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Appendix 6: The data and calculations of observed roads 
Traffic accidents, fatalities and injuries in a comparison group of road sections without speed 
camera installment before and after deployment of speed camera program from 2003 to 2017. 
The grey colour marks the years when speed cameras were installed.  
Roads 
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Tallinn-
Tartu-Võru-
Luhamaa 
Acc 29 43 46 54 49 42 13 19 19 29 30 22 10 24 10 
Fat 3 3 4 5 5 3 1 1 2 6 2 2 1 0 0 
Inj 48 70 64 83 84 66 18 26 33 47 59 30 10 32 35 
Tallinn-
Pärnu-Ikla 
Acc 18 27 24 28 28 16 13 14 13 13 7 11 15 23 11 
Fat 5 3 7 2 7 0 0 3 1 3 0 2 4 2 2 
Inj 45 52 42 41 51 24 25 19 16 16 10 12 17 32 19 
Tallinn-
Narva 
Acc 24 30 48 58 39 19 13 18 12 17 15 15 9 26 18 
Fat 9 8 9 10 5 2 0 3 4 5 4 4 3 2 6 
Inj 28 44 65 85 68 36 15 24 19 28 24 18 12 42 33 
Ääsmäe-
Haapsalu-
Rohuküla 
Acc 8 11 15 16 13 15 6 4 8 2 5 10 1 8 14 
Fat 2 0 1 2 1 3 2 1 1 0 4 0 0 1 2 
Inj 9 19 19 31 15 18 6 5 9 3 6 12 2 10 25 
Saku-Laagri Acc 1 3 4 3 2 7 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 3 1 
Fat 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Inj 1 9 4 2 2 13 3 2 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 
Tallinn-
Rannamõisa-
Kloogaranna 
Acc 2 3 5 13 11 6 8 4 3 6 3 6 2 7 5 
Fat 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Inj 2 2 6 15 13 11 10 7 5 10 7 5 2 10 8 
Tallinn-
Rapla-Türi 
Acc 12 17 18 18 20 13 7 9 7 10 2 6 11 11 8 
Fat 4 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Inj 8 30 28 31 28 15 9 16 10 18 2 8 22 18 11 
Tallinn-
Paldiski 
Acc 3 14 9 17 15 10 4 5 5 7 9 3 10 4 6 
Fat 0 1 1 2 5 1 0 3 1 2 3 0 1 1 0 
Inj 5 20 16 21 21 12 5 5 8 9 14 4 14 3 8 
Source: Police and Border Guard Board (2018), compiled by the author. 
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